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ters could be taken into consideration as a basis for the con-
clusion. (Crater· v. Crater, 135 Cal. 633, 634 [67 P. 1049].) 
No abuse of discretion has been shown. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and 
Spence, .T., concurred. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
[S. F. No. 18481. In Bank. Oct. 16, 1953.] 
SAFEWAY S'l'ORES, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, 
v. RETAIL CLEHKS IN'fERNA'fiONAL ASSOCIA-
TION et al., Appellants. 
[1] Labor-Collective Bargaining-Bargaining Representatives.-
Store managers of grocery chain store system are supervisors 
or agents of management within purview of Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stats. 136, § 101), amending 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (29 U.S.C. §§ 151-159) 
and removing supervisors from classification of employees for 
collective barg·aining purposes. 
[2] !d.-Collective Bargaining-State ControL-By exclusion of 
supervisory employees and regulation of their collective bar-
gaining rights from N a tiona! Labor Relations Act, the field as 
to them is left open to state control. 
[3] !d.-Collective Bargaining-Jurisdiction of Court or Board.-
State court has jurisdiction, independent of any determination 
by National Labor R.elations Board that store managers are 
supervisors, to regulate or enjoin activities of retail clerks' 
unions for purpose of requiring store managers to be included 
in labor contracts of clerks with employer; and since state 
court can act, it has jurisdiction to determine facts on which 
its jurisdiction depends. 
[ 4] Id.- Collective Bargaining- Bargaining Representatives.-
Right of self-organization and of selection of a bargaining 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Labor, § 26; Am.Jur., 
Labor, § 96 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 8] Labor, §3a; [5] Labor, §20a; 
[6] Courts, § 90; [7] Contracts, § 48; [9] Labor, §§ 20a, 25. 
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t'epresentative are rights which exist independently of labor 
relations acts, and existing right includes union organization 
and traditional peaceful strike for higher wages. 
[5] !d.-Concerted Union Activity.-Concerted union activity for 
an objective which is not reasonably related to any legitimate 
interest of organized labor will be enjoined. 
[6] Courts-Decisions-Power of Courts-Scope of Determination. 
-While questions of public policy are primarily for legislative 
department to determine, when neither Constitution nor Legis-
lature has spoken on subject the courts may make the declara-
tion. 
[7] Contracts-Legality-Public Policy.-The term "public policy" 
is inherently not subject to precise definition; it is as broad 
as question of what is fraud, and has been defined as anything 
which tends to undermine that sense of security for individual 
rights which any citizen ought to feel is against public policy. 
[8] Labor-Collective Bargaining-Bargaining Representatives.-
Since store managers are agents of management, when so acting 
they owe undivided loyalty to their principal and should be 
kept free from divided loyalty that would be engendered by 
compulsory membership in retail clerks' local unions; an em-
ployee union may not properly insist that a representative of 
employer be required to participate in its deliberations under 
union rules and thus divide his loyalty. 
[9] !d.-Concerted Union Activity: Injunctive Relief.-Activities 
of retail, .. clerks' union in picketing or striking for purpose of 
requiring inclusion of store managers in clerks' collective bar-
gaining contract with employer are not reasonably related to 
any legitimate interest of organized labor and, not being in 
furtherance of any proper labor objective, are as a matter of 
sound public policy enjoinable within equity jurisdiction of 
court. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. Ralph E. Hoyt, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to enjoin strike activities of certain unions. Judg-
ment granting preliminary injunction, affirmed. 
James F. Galliano, C. Paul Paduck, Benjamin Dreyfus and 
Alexander H. Schullman for Appellants. 
Roland C. Davis, J. D. Burdick, Carroll, Davis & Freiden-
rich as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants. 
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Mitchell T. Neff, \Villard S. ,Johnston, B. H. Parkinson, .Jr., 
Orrick, Dahlquist, Neff & Herrington, John B. Rosson, Brown, 
Rosson & Berry and Edward E. Mitchell for Respondent. 
Iddings, Jeffrey, \Veisman & Rogers and Pillsbury, Madi-
son & Sutro as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
SHENK, J.~This is an action to enjoin strike activities 
of the defendant unions. A preliminary injunction issued. 
The defendants have appealed. 
The controversy leading to the commencement of the action 
arose after the enactment of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act in 1947 ( 61 Stats. 136, § 101), amending the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act of 1935 (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-167), 
and removing supervisors from tl1e classification of employees 
as defined in the act. 'l'he problem concerns the effect of 
the Labor Management Relations Act on the right of the 
defendant local unions to recog·nition as the bargaining agents 
for the plaintiff's local store managers for the purpose of 
coercing the inclusion of store managers in the retail clerks' 
collective bargaining contract with the employer. 
The plaintiff, herein referred to as Safeway, is a corpora-
tion engaged in the business of owning and operating retail 
food stores throughout the United States. For the purposes 
of this case it is engaged in interstate commerce. The de-
fendants are the Retail Clerks International Association, an 
unincorporated association, the affiliated state association, and 
the local clerks' unions of Alameda and Contra Costa counties 
in this state. 
Seventy-six of Safeway's stores are located in the counties 
mentioned. In each store a manager and from four to 2;~ 
clerks and butchers are employed. Each store stocks some 
1,800 different food and household items and daily sales run 
from $700 to $3,000. The clerks belong to their retail clerks' 
local unions. rrhe butchers belong to their separate union. 
In addition other employees, such as deliverymen, belong to 
tlwir own union. Each store is separate geographirally from 
the others and each has its individual store manager. 
Beginning in 1937 and until September 19, 1949, clerks 
and store managers were mem hers of the cleffmdant local 
unions under current labor contracts. It is assumed that prior 
to the present controversy the nnions were the eertified bar-
gainillg representatives of the store managers and clerks 
1mder the National I1abor Relations Act. Before tbe expira-
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tion of the last contract on the above date in 1949 certain 
wage increases were demanded. During the course of the 
negotiations the plaintiff announced that local store managers 
would no longer be included in the labor contract. On Sep-
tember 19, 1949, one of the defendant local unions instituted 
a strike and began picketing. vVage increases for store man-
agers and clerks were settled on October 19th and were put 
into effect by Safeway on October 26th. Upon the refusal 
of Safevvay to include store managers in the contract or to 
recognize the clerks' unions as the representatives of the 
store managers, the other union then struck. The strike and 
picketing continued until the commencement of this action 
in November, 1949. A hearing on the order to show cause 
was had on the verified complaint, numerous affidavits, and 
oral testimony. It consumed 76 court days and resulted in the 
issuance of the preliminary injunction on March 22, 1950. 
As material here the trial court's order enjoined the de-
fendants from engaging in concerted activities to induce or 
compel the plaintiff to require union membership of its store 
managers in the local unions or to bargain to that end with 
the store managers or with the unions on their behalf. These 
provisions of the order are based on the facts disclosed at 
the hearing and the conclusions of the court drawn therefrom 
that the store managers are supervisors within the meaning 
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. The pro-
priety of that conclusion and of the action of the trial court 
on the record are the questions presented. 
There are, of course, no findings as such at this stage of 
the proceeding. They follow appropriately after the trial 
of the action. The facts, for present purposes, are disclosed 
by the allegations of the verified complaint, the averments 
of numerous affidavits, other documentary evidence, and the 
oral testimony. It was for the trial court to resolve any 
conflicts in the evidence. 
In the opinion of the trial court, which has been made 
a part of the record (rule 5 (a) of Rules on Appeal), it is 
stated: (1) that the store managers (referred to generally 
by the plaintiff as location managers, and by the defendants 
as managing clerks), are supervisory employees who act as 
agents of management entrusted with the formulation and 
execution on behalf of management of substantial matters 
involving judgment and policy; (2) that no issue was pre-
sented concerning the wages, hours or working conditions of 
the clerks or the store managers; (3) that the object of the 
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strike was to compel Safeway to bargain and contract with 
the clerks' union concerning membership of its store managers 
in the defendant local unions; ( 4) that the strike was not 
a jurisdictional strike as contended by Safeway and as de-
nounced by section 1118 of the Labor Code of this state; 
( 5) that the bylaws of the local unions provide that" only mem-
bers not having the right to hire or fire shall be eligible to, 
or shall hold, office''; that ''any member who is guilty of 
improper conduct . . . shall be fined, suspended or expelled'' ; 
( 6) that the executive boards of the two local unions are 
vested with the ''power to ... discipline any member by 
fine, removal from employment or other penalty . . . for 
conduct wh-ich tends to undermine the purposes for which 
the union is formed"; (7) that the constitution of the Retail 
Clerks' International Association contains substantially the 
same provisions and in addition provides that ''it shall be 
the duty of members of every local union individually and 
collectively to do all in their power to advance the cause of 
organized labor . . . '' ; ( 8) that each store manager has the 
final decision as to whether clerks shall be employed to 
work or shall continue to work in the store of which he is 
manager; ( 9) that violence, intimidation and coercion on the 
part of pickets of defendant local unions have occurred in such 
a way as to indicate their recurrence unless restrained by 
an appropriate order; (10) that the purpose of the picketing 
is to further an objective which is contrary to the public 
policy of the state and therefore unlawful; imd ( 11) that the 
plaintiff is suffering serious damage as a result of the de-
fendants' activities. There is an abundance of evidence to 
support the foregoing statements of fact and conclusions. 
It is contended by the defendants that the trial court 
had no jurisdiction to act on the subject matter of the com-
plaint and that exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the Na-
tional I_jabor Helations Board. 'l1he history of the federal 
legislation on the subject may be resorted to in considering 
the effect of the changes in the la-vY. It may be assumed that 
before the enactments of 1947 the subject matter of the 
controversy was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. Bnt the changes compel an 
opposite conclusion. 
Section 2 ( 3) of the act of 194 7 excludes from the definition 
of ''employee'' ''any individual employed as a supervisor.'' 
Section 2 ( 11) states that the "term 'supervisor' means any 
individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, 
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to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, 
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly 
to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to 
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing 
the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or 
clerical nature, but requires the usc of independent judgment." 
The evidence is overwhelming to the effect that the local 
store managers have authority in the interest of their em-
ployer to direct the activities of employees under their super-
vision, to effectively make recommendations in disciplinary 
matters and to hire and discharge the clerks. Both sides con-
cede that store managers perform the duties of clerks when 
necessary or in their spare time. [1] The record, however, 
supports the conclusion that the store managers act as agents 
of management in substantial and important matters of judg-
ment and policy. The inclusion of detailed evidentiary matter 
in this respect is unnecessary in view of decisions of the 
National Labor Relations Board in similar cases that such store 
managers are supervisors. (National Tea Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 
No. 148, N.L.R.B. Decisions ( OOH), par. 9922, 1950; Re 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 59 N.L.R.B. 936, 938 (1944).) In No-
vember 1949, in related cases involving Safeway in neighbor-
ing counties the National J_,abor Relations Board ordered the 
clerks' union not to bargain collectively with Safeway by de-
manding as a condition the inclusion of store managers. That 
order implies a holding that the store managers are super-
visors. 'in Ohio Power Co. v. N.L.R.B. (1949), 176 F.2d 385, 
388, it was said that § 2 (11) covers any individual having 
authority responsibly to direct; that it ''does not require the 
exercise of the power described for all or any definite part of 
the employee's time. It is the existence of the power which 
determines the classification.'' In that case the court ordered 
that the board's certification of representatives entered prior 
to the effective date of the Labor Management Relations Act 
be set aside to the extent that supervisory employees involved 
were included in the unit, and that the certification be amended 
to exclude them from the unit. 
[2] By the exclusion of supervisory employees and the 
regulation of their collective bargaining rights from the 
federal act the field as to them was left open to state control. 
(Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board, 
315 U.S. 740 [62 S.Ot. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154]; cf. Gerry of Cali-
fornia v. Superior Court, 32 Oal.2d 119 [194 P.2d 689] .) 
[3] Therefore, the contention that the state court has no juris-
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diction until the National Labor Relations Board in the first in-
stance determines that store managers are supervisors is with-
out merit; and since the state court can act, it has the juris-
diction to determine the facts upon which its jurisdiction de-
pends. (Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460, 
464 [171 P.2d 8]; appeal dismissed, 331 U.S. 549 [67 S.Ot. 
1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666] .) In the present case the jurisdictional 
fact that store managers are supervisors has been determined 
with evidentiary support adversely to the defendants' con-
tention. 
The question then is as to the rights of the clerks' unions 
under state law to engage in concerted activities against Safe-
way for the purpose of requiring store managers to be in-
cluded in the labor contract of the clerks. 
The federal amendatory act neither enlarges nor limits the 
existing fundamental rights of supervisors. What it does 
is to unclassify supervisors as employees under federal and 
state acts regulating the exercise of employees' collective bar-
gaining rights, coupled with the inhibition against compul-
sions on the employer engaged in interstate commerce to 
include supervisors as employees for the purpose of such acts. 
The decisional and other authorities define existing funda-
mental labor rights. [4] The right of self-organization and 
of selection of a bargaining representative are rights which 
exist independently of labor relations acts. The existing right 
includes union organization for the conduct of collective bar-
gaining and the traditional peaceful strike for higher wages. 
(See 'l'orts, Restatement, § 784.) It was characterized and 
recognized as a fundamental right long before it was pro-
tected under the National Labor Relations .Act and similar 
state acts. (International Union v. Wisconsin Emp. Rela-
tions Board, 336 U.S. 245, 259 [69 S.Ot. 516, 93 L.Ed. 651] ; 
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &; Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 [57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 .A.L.R. 
1352] ; see, also, International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 
457 [70 S.Ct. 781, 94 L.Ed. 978].) It was the regulation of 
this fundamental right of the labor supervisory personnel 
formerly included within the federal act that the 1947 amend-
atory provisions left to the states for separate classification 
and regulation. 
[5] It is undisputed that concerted union activity for an 
objective which is not reasonably relatec1 to any legitimate 
interest of organized labor will be enjoined. It was said in 
.J arnes v. Marins hip Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721 at page 728 [155 
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P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900]; "It should be recognized at the 
outset that a union may use the various forms of concerted 
action . . . to enforce an objective that is reasonably related 
to any legitimate interest of organized labor . . . (citing 
cases). It is equally well settled that the object of concerted 
labor activity must be proper and that it must be sought by 
lawful means, otherwise the persons injured by such activity 
may obtain damages or injunctive relief." In that case the 
plaintiff employees successfully sought the exercise of the 
equity powers of the court to control the activities of fellow 
employees and management contrary to the rights of the 
plaintiffs. Those rights were not protected or controlled by 
any statutory regulation. So here the equity jurisdiction 
of the court was invoked by the plaintiff to be protected 
against unjustifiable coercion on the part of one group of its 
employees concerning a matter which also was not the sub-
ject of any statutory regulation or control and was contrary 
to the rights of the plaintiff. 
The trial court concluded that the union activity was con-
trary to public policy and therefore unlawful. One of the 
questions presented is whether it has appropriately done so. 
[6] It is true that questions of public policy are primarily 
for the leg·islative department to determine. But it is also 
true that when neither the Constitution nor the Legislature 
has spoken on the subject the courts may make the declara-
tion. 
In cases without number the state courts have declared 
contracts, transactions and activities of individuals, associa-
tions and corporations to be contrary to public policy where 
their legislative departments have not spoken on the subject. 
One of the latest restatements of the rule is by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Building Service etc. Union v. 
Gazzam (1949), 339 U.S. 532 [70 S.Ct. 784, 94 L.Ed. 1045], 
where it was said at page 536: "The public policy of any 
state is to be found in its constitution, acts of the legislature, 
and decisions of its courts. 'Primarily it is for the lawmakers 
to determine the public policy of the state.' Twin City Pipe 
Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 [51 S.Ct. 
476, 75 L.Ed. 1112]." 
This court has within recent years declared the public 
policy of the state within the particular field here involved. 
(James v. Marinship Cm·p., supra (1944), 25 Ca1.2d 721; 
IIttghes v. Superior Court (1948), 32 Cal.2d 850 [198 P.2d 
885], affirmed 339 U.S. 460 [70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985] .) 
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[7] The term "public policy" is inherently not subject to 
precise definition. In Maryland CastwUy Co. v. Fidelity & 
Casualty Co., 71 Cal.App. 492, the court stated at page 497 
!236 P. 210] : "The question, what is public policy in a given 
case, is as broad as the question of what is fraud.'' Also in 
Noble v. Palo .Alto, 89 Cal.App. 47, the court said at pp. 
50-51 [264 P. 529] : "Public policy is a vague expression, and 
few cases can arise in which its application may not be dis-
puted. Mr. Story, in his work on Contracts ( § 546), says: 
'It has never been defined by the courts, but has been left 
loose and free of definition in the same manner as fraud.' 
By 'public policy' is intended that principle of law which 
holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tend-
ency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. 
. . . Public Policy means . . . anything which tends to under-
mine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of 
personal liberty or private property, which any citizen ought 
to feel is against public policy .... " 
[8] Since on this record store managers are agents of 
management, when so acting they owe undivided loyalty to 
their principal. As members of the defendant unions they 
would under union rules be in duty bound to advance the 
cause of the community of interest of store managers and 
clerks in any dispute or disagreement with their principal. 
They would be under constant apprehension of the penalties 
under union rules, such as fines, suspension, or expulsion. 
It is eminently proper that management supervisors, the store 
managers in this case, be kept free from the divided loyalty 
that would be engendered by compulsory membership in the 
defendant local unions. Under the law an employer may not 
demand that his representatives sit in the inner councils of 
labor and thus be placed in the position of exerting his in-
fluence in directing labor's policies and activities. If such 
au objective were recognized and were accomplished collective 
bargaining would be in confusion and indeed futile. By the 
same token an employee union may not insist that a represen-
tative of the employer be required to participate in its de-
liberations under union rules and thus divide his loyalty. 
[9] Confronted with the responsibility of declaration 
where as here there is no constitutional or legislative guide 
on the subject we hold that the trial court was correct in 
deciding that the coercion sought to be exercised by the de-
fendants under the circumstances of this case was not reason-
ably related to any legitimate interest of organized labor; 
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that the activities of the defendants were not in the further-
ance of any proper labor objective, and that as a matter of 
sound public policy were enjoinable within the equity juris-
diction of the court. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTEl~, J.-I dissent. 
The majority holds that the federal law (Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act) has no bearing on this case and that 
the question is one of state law. \Vith that I agree. 
The sole question, as put by the majority opinion, is 
whether the public policy of this state forbids the representa-
tion in collective bargaining of supervisory employees by a 
union composed of the rank and file employees. The majority 
opinion holds that public policy does prohibit such representa-
tion, and, as a corollary thereof, that concerted activity by 
the union to compel such representation is for an unlawful 
object and therefore enjoinable. I am not concerned with 
the latter question because I do not believe such representa-
tion is against the public policy of this state. Indeed, the 
public policy as expressed by the Legislature is directly to 
the contrary. The statute states: "[T] he public policy of 
this State is declared as follows: 
"Negotiation of terms and conditions of labor should re-
sult from voluntary agreement between employer and em-
ployees. Governmental authority has permitted and en-
couraged employers to organize in the corporate and other 
forms of capital control. In dealing with such employers, the 
individual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual 
liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and 
thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employ-
ment. Therefore it is necessary that the individual workman 
have full freedom of association, self-organization, and desig-
nation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate 
the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall 
be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of em-
ployers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such 
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection.'' (Emphasis added; Lab. Code, 
§ 923.) Thus an employee shall have the right to bargain 
collectively through a representative of h~s own choosing. 
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Here the rank and file union is the representative chosen by 
the store managers and to hold that they may not choose 
such representative is contrary to section 923, supra. There 
is no qualification on the term "employee" in section 923. 
Therefore it embraces supervisory as well as nonsupervisory 
employees. It has been held that a mine superintendent is 
an employee within the meaning of the labor laws (Davis v. 
Morris, 37 Cal.App.2d 269 [99 P.2d 345]), and it has been 
held repeatedly that supervisory employees came within the 
term "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act 
until it was amended in 1947 to expressly exclude them 
from the term. (L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 163 F .2d 905; National Labor 
Relat1:ons Board v. Swift & Co., 162 F.2d 575; Wells, Inc. v. 
Nat'ional Labor Relations Board, 162 F.2d 457; Packard Motor 
Car Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 485 
[67 S.Ct. 789, 91 L.Ed.1040] .) In the Packard case, it was held 
that supervisory employees were ·within the term ''employee'' 
used in the National Labor Relations Act and hence entitled 
to the benefits of the act, that is, to have the employer bar-
gain collectively with an association formed to represent 
them in such bargaining, the court stating: ''The point that 
these foremen are employees both in the most technical sense 
at common law as well as in common acceptance of the term, 
is too obvious to be labored. The Company, however, turns 
to the Act's definition of employer, which it contends reads 
foremen out of the employee class and into the class of 
employers. (Section 2 (2) reads: 'The term ''employer'' in-
cludes any person acting in the interest of an employer, 
directly or indirectly. . . . ' 49 Stat. 450. The context of 
the Act, we think, leaves no room for a construction of this 
section to deny the organizational privilege to employees be-
cause they act in the interest of an employer. Every employee, 
from the very fact of employment in the master's business, 
is required to act in his interest. He owes to the employer 
faithful performance of service in his interest, the protection 
of the employer's property in his custody or control, and all 
employees may, as to third padies, a.ct in the interests of the 
employer to such an extent that he is liable for their wrongful 
acts . ... " 
"Even those who act for the employer in some matters, 
including the service of standing between management and 
man1ral labor, st?:ll have interests of their own as employees. 
41 C.2d-19 
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1'hmtgh the foreman is the faithful representative of the 
employer in maintaining a prodttction schedttle, his interest 
properly rnay be adverse to that of the employer when it 
comes to fixing his own wages, hmtrs, seniority rights or work-
·ing condit1:ons. He does not lose his 1·ight to serve himself in 
these respects because he se1·ves his master in others . ... 
"The company's argument is really addressed to the un-
desirability of permitting foremen to organize. It wants 
selfless representatives of its interest. It fears that if fore-
men combine to bargain advantages for themselves, they 
will sometimes be governed by interests of their own or of 
their fellow foremen, rather than by the company's interest. 
'I' here is nothing new in this argument. It is rooted in the 
misconception that because the employer has the right to 
wholehearted loyalty in the performance of the contract of 
employment, the employee does not have the right to protect 
h1:s independent and adver·se interest in the terms of the con-
tract itself and the conditions of work. But the effect of the 
National Labor Relations Act is otherwise, and it is for 
Congress, not for us, to create exceptions or qualifications at 
odds with its plain terms. 
"Moreover, the company concedes that foremen have a right 
to organize. What ·it denies is that the statute compels it to 
recognize the 1mion. In other words, it wants to be free to 
fight the foremen's union in the way that companies fought 
other unions before the Labor Act. But there is nothing in 
the Act which indicates that Congress intended to deny its 
benefits to foremen as employees, if they choose to believe 
that their interests as employees would be better served by 
organization than by individual competition. . . . 
"It is also urged upon us most seriously that unionization 
of foremen is from many points bad industrial policy, that 
it puts the ttnion foreman in the position of serving two 
masters, divides his loyalty and makes generally for bad rela-
t?:ons between management and labor. However we might 
appraise the force of these arguments as a policy matter, we 
are not authorized to base decision of a question of law upon 
them. They concern the wisdom of the legislation j they cannot 
alter the meaning of otherwise plain provisions." (Emphasis 
added; Packard JJ1otor Car Co. v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 330 U.S. 485, 488-493 [67 S.Ct. 789, 91 hE d. 1040].) 
IJikewise in the present case, section 923, supra, by the use 
of the term "employee" without qualification includes super-
visory employees, namely, the store managers, and the Legis-
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lature has declared that such employees shall have the right 
to bargain collectively with a representative of their own 
choosing. Hence they may choose the rank and file union 
as their representative. The Legislature has so declared and 
this court is not authorized to declare a contrary policy as 
does the majority here. 
It may be suggested that the managers are entitled to 
form their own union separate from the rank and file union 
and have it represent them in bargaining, but they cannot, 
as here, have the rank and file union as their representative. 
The majority opinion does not discuss this question but the 
clear implication is that it would be unlawful for a union 
of managers to bring concerted action to compel the employer 
to bargain with it. In the first place, there is no such limitation 
in section 923, supra. It is left solely to the supervisory 
employees to decide who shall represent them and that includes 
either a managers' union or rank and file union. 
In regard to a distinction, if any, between the right to bar-
g·ain through a managers' union or a rank and file union, 
the majority opinion in summarizing its holding, states : 
''Since on this record store managers are agents of manage-
ment when so acting they owe undivided loyalty to their 
principal. As members of the defendant unions they would 
under union rules be in duty bound to advance the cause of 
the community of interest of store managers and clerks in any 
dispute or disagreement with their principal. They would 
be under constant apprehension of the penalties under union 
rules, such as fines, suspension, or expulsion. It is eminently 
proper that management supervisors, the store managers in 
this case, be kept free from the divided loyalty that would 
be engendered by compulsory membership in the defendant 
local unions. Under the law an employer may not demand 
that his representatives sit in the inner councils of labor 
and thus be placed in the position of exerting his influence in 
directing labor's policies and activities. If such an objective 
were recognized and were accomplished collective bargaining 
would be in confusion and indeed futile.'' The same argu-
ments there made would apply regardless of whether a rank 
and file union or managers' union was the representative of 
the managers because the latter union would have its rules 
and threats of suspension for any member who was not loyal 
to the union's cause of obtaining the best terms of employ-
ment possible for its members. Its interests would conflict 
with the employer's interests the same as the interests of a 
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rank and file union. It should be observed that the majority 
opinion refers to the "compulsory membership" of the man-
agers in the rank and file union. As far as appears, the man-
agers are not being compelled to belong to the rank and file 
union and have it as their representative. They are willing 
and want to join such union and have such representation. 
This brings us to the question of whether there is or should 
be any public policy against the formation and use, as a bar-
gaining representative, of a union by the managers alone. 
From what I have stated above, it clearly appears that the 
policy, as stated by the Legislature (Lab. Code, § 923, supra), 
authorizes such representation. Aside from the Legislature's 
declaration, however, it should be clear that the policy favors 
such representation. The soundness of that proposition is 
demonstrated by the decision in Packard Motor Car Co. v. 
Labor Board, 330 U.S. 485, quoted supra. Moreover, such 
representation is not new in the law. In the newspaper and 
job printing field, foremen have been members of the rank 
and file unions since 1889. (See 55 Yale L.,J. 772.) The same 
is true in other industries such as building trades, metal 
trades, and railroads. (Collective Bargaining by Foremen, 
12 Labor Relations Reporter, 421, May, 1943, Bureau of Na-
tional Affairs.) In National Labor Relat,ions Board v. Edward 
G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571, 577, cert. denied 335 U.S. 
908 [69 S.Ct. 411, 93 hEel. 441], the court in discussing the 
claim that the Labor Management Relations Act (1947 amend-
ment) was unconstitutional as to foremen because they were 
excluded from its protection, held the act constitutional but 
said: ''The right of employees to form labor organizations 
and to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing with employers has long been recognized. 
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 
33, 34, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352." 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November 
12, 1953. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
